National Transportation Safety Board
Office of Marine Safety

Group Chairman's Factual Report
Survival Factors

Accident Number: DCA-04-MM-015

August 18, 2005

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Accident

Accident No.	DCA-04-MM-015
Vessel Involved:	*Lady D*
Location:	Northwest Harbor, Patapsco River, Baltimore, MD
Date:	March 06, 2004
Time:	~1600 EST[1]

Survival Factors Group Representatives

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[1] All times are in Eastern Standard Time as read on a 24-hour clock, unless specifically noted.

Accident Summary

On March 06, 2004, at approximately 1550 on an overcast afternoon, the pontoon type water taxi *Lady D* departed the Fort McHenry fireboat pier #1 with 23 passengers and two crewmembers on board. The water taxi's scheduled route for the day was from Fells Point to Fort McHenry and then back to Fells Point. As the *Lady D* had departed the pier for her final journey of the day going towards Fells Point, heavy rains and windstorm began to increase in intensity. The vessel began to roll in the waves and at one point dramatically rolled to starboard side and then capsized. One passenger died at the scene, another passenger died within a 72-hour period and three deceased passengers were recovered from the bottom of the harbor one week after the accident, a total of five fatalities. Another passenger is receiving long-term medical care and the remaining passengers were treated and released for minor injuries.

Accident Narrative

The small passenger vessel *Lady D*, operated by the Seaport Taxi, was placed into routine service for the day at 1100 on the day of the accident March 06, 2004. Its scheduled route for the day was from Fells Point to Fort McHenry, and then back to Fell Point, with a round trip time of 30 to 35 minutes. The *Lady D* was operated on this schedule throughout the day, until the time of the accident. With a crew of two and no passengers aboard, the *Lady D* arrived at Fort McHenry fireboat pier #1 about 1545. As no passengers were disembarked at the dock upon arrival, the fort coordinator directed about 19 waiting passengers to board the *Lady D.* Subsequently, four additional passengers boarded, and the *Lady D* departed the fireboat pier.

Shortly after the *Lady D* departed Fort McHenry, the senior captain (on the water), who was operating another pontoon type water taxi between Harbor Place and Fells Point, noticed the approach of the bad weather. He reported to the company's other vessels by VHF radio that a squall was in the harbor and that boat operators should find the nearest safe place to wait for the storm to pass. The senior captain then called the master of the *Lady D* to see if he had left the Fort dock. The senior captain also recommended two safe locations for the captain of the *Lady D* to attempt a landing. The captain of the *Lady D* responded that he had already left Fort McHenry, and that diverting to a safe landing sounded like an excellent idea. The Office Manager of Seaport Taxi overheard the transmission and checked the National Weather Service's Doppler weather image on her computer. She subsequently reported by VHF to the fleet that the heaviest concentrations of precipitation were to the north and south of downtown

Baltimore, and that areas of blue and green precipitation were over the harbor. She also stated that it appeared as if the severest weather would not affect the harbor. Shortly afterwards, the senior captain arrived at Fells Point and called the *Lady D* again, but the captain of Lady D did not respond. The senior captain then attempted to call the *Lady D* captain on the company UHF radio. He also attempted to call the cell phones of both the master and mate.

According to witness statements, the *Lady D* had backed away from the Fort pier and began its voyage to Fell Point. A heavy rain and windstorm began as the vessel departed from Fort McHenry. The intensity of the rain and wind was reportedly high and increasing. The passengers reported that the vessel began to roll in the waves. Some passengers reported that the wind was initially off the port bow of the *Lady D*, and that relative direction of the wind began to shift in counterclockwise direction. The intensity of the rolling increased until the vessel heeled to starboard dramatically causing some passengers to leave their seats and shift to the port side. The vessel's list to starboard decreased and the mate asked passengers to return to their seats. Some passengers recall the captain altering course to starboard. Moments later, the vessel dramatically heeled to starboard again, and continued over on to her starboard side, and then capsized. Some passengers estimated that the capsizing event took only a few seconds. The crew did not instruct passengers to put on life preservers and no one put one on before the vessel capsized. The crew and most of the passengers were able to escape through the side windows to the surface.

About 1600, two persons from the Naval Reserve Center at Fort McHenry witnessed the accident and called 911. Shortly afterward, about 19 persons from the Naval Reserve Center boarded a navy mechanized landing craft (LCM-27) moored at the Center's dock, and proceeded to the accident location to render assistance. The LCM was the first vessel to arrive at the scene to render assistance. Most of the passengers were transferred from the water to the LCM and transported back to shore by the crew of the LCM.

A marine firefighter (Marine Pilot) at the Baltimore City Fireboat Station witnessed the accident and alerted others at the fireboat station. A 30-foot fire rescue boat was dispatched to the scene to render assistance. A Baltimore City Marine Police department vessel later joined the fire rescue boat. According to preliminary information, two injured passengers along with a non-injured passenger were transported to shore by the fire rescue boat, and one injured passenger was transported to shore by the police boat.

At 1616, the Coast Guard heard of the accident via VHF channel 16 (they overheard chatter about the accident), and dispatched two SAR vessels (small boats) to the scene. Subsequently, the USCG dispatched one helicopters and a third SAR vessel to join the SAR operations.
The operating company of the vessel, Seaport Taxi, sent its fleet captain and the senior captain to the area to assist. These persons, aboard another company vessel, without direction from the on scene commander, conducted surface searches of the area to the south (downstream) of the accident location.

All but three persons were accounted for within an hour of the accident. The three missing passengers were located and recovered from the bottom of the harbor one week after the accident. Of the twenty-two persons accounted for after the accident, one passenger died at the scene, a second passenger died within 72 hours, and a third passenger continues to be under long-term medical care. The remaining passengers were treated by local hospitals for minor injuries and released.

Actions Since the Accident

According to media reports, in early November 2004, Living Classrooms, Seaport Taxi's parent company, entered into a partnership agreement with Ed Kane's Watertaxi Service, a competitor to Seaport Taxi. Living Classrooms ceased operating its fleet of nine vessels and began selling water taxi tickets at its National Historic Seaport kiosk locations for its former competitor's service. In addition, Living Classrooms agreed to provide marketing and job training. Kane had no plans to buy the Seaport Taxi vessels, and they will likely be sold to operators outside of the Baltimore area.

Location of accident

East Channel of the Patapsco River in the northwest harbor section near buoy "NH"

Injuries

Injuries are categorized according to the injury criteria of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). For uniformity, the Safety Board uses the ICAO injury criteria in all its accident reports, regardless of transportation mode.

Table 1. Injuries Sustained

Injuries	Crew	Passengers	Total
Fatal	0	5	5
Serious	0	4	4
Minor	2	10	12
None	0	4	4
Total	2	23	25

Title 49 CFR section 830.2 defines a fatal injury as any injury that results in death with 30 days of an accident. It defines serious injury as that which requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours, commencing within 7 days from the date the injury was received; results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, toes, or nose); causes severe hemorrhages, nerve, muscle or tendon damage; involves any internal organ; or involves second- or third- degree burns, or any burn affecting more than 5 percent of the body surface.

All but one passenger and both crewmembers on board the *Lady D* were transported by ambulances to local hospitals in Baltimore City. Ten of the passengers and the crew (captain and the mate) of the *Lady D* reported minor injuries to include lacerations, contusions, cold-water immersion, abrasions and strains upon medical evaluation and released within 24 hours. One passenger, who was considered to have minor injuries, actually was in the hospital for three days for observation. Four passengers were considered serious either due to length of hospital stay, near drowning-cardiac arrest, fracture and dislocation, heart conditions and/or surgery. Five passengers died from drowning with complication of hypothermia. Additionally, the remaining four passengers were transferred to local hospitals for observations but they did not sustain any injuries and therefore released the same day.

Personnel Information

Captain was a retired 74-year-old male that started his third year with Seaport Taxi at the time of the accident. The captain held a 50 gross registered tons Coast Guard license issued 30 April 2002 and expired April 30, 2007. He worked a regular schedule of Saturdays and Sundays for Seaport Taxi.

Overall the captain's health was good and he did not take any [prescription] medications. However, about three years before the accident, he started to wear hearing aids simply because of his job. He wanted to make sure he could hear the radio and discriminate between background music and background noises. His eyesight was about 20/38 and had been corrected to just under 20/20.

According to the captain, Seaport Taxi through the Living Classroom Foundation did perform random drug testing and the captain was tested approximately 5-6 weeks before the accident. They are part of a consortium. The mate was a 55-year old male who started working for Seaport Taxi May of 2003. He held a 50 gross registered tons Coast Guard license, which he obtained in October of 2003. His position as the mate working for Seaport Taxi did not require for him to obtain a license because all vessels the Seaport Taxi fleet were required by the Coast Guard to carry only one licensed crewmember.

The mate did take a prescription medication for reflux and he was near sighted and wore glasses. The mate was able to maneuver the vessel and had practiced docking the *Lady D* when there were no passengers on board. However, when there were passengers on board his duties consisted of making safety announcements, informing passengers about the trip, where the life preservers were stowed, collecting tickets and hand stamping the passengers.

Vessel Information

Passengers and crew embarked the vessel at the bow by stepping down a ladder, through a door into the enclosed cabin area. The forward bulkhead had a sliding glass door, where as the aft bulkhead had a swinging door with a glass panel.

The length of the cabin of the vessel was 24 feet with 12-window sections and two windows per section of two feet each. Each side of the vessel had six windows. Each window had two panes, one of which opened by sliding and was 24 inches in width. The window arrangement on the *Lady D* was one fixed and one sliding horizontally, unlike windows on a schoolbus, where the top window slide vertically down while bottom window is stationary. The width of the pontoon vessel was eight feet. The benches ran fore and aft against the bulkhead so all the passengers were seated facing each other.

Inside the *Lady D*, adult life jackets were stowed under the benches and the child vests also were stowed under the benches and forward on the port side. Further, there was a placard posted inside the pontoon vessel giving instructions of how to don a life jacket.

There were a total of 10 child size life jackets and 25 adult size life jackets, which is more, then regulation required.[2]

USCG-Certificate of Inspection for the Lady D states:

COI Certification Date: 28 February 2002

Expiration Date: 28 February 2007

Life Preserves

"The minimum number of child-size life preservers required is three. If more than three children (or person weighing 90 pounds or less) are carried, additional child-size life preservers shall be carried so that the vessel has an approved life preserver suitable for each child onboard."

Lifesaving Equipment

Total equipment for 25 persons:

Life Preservers (Adult)	25
Life Preservers (Child)	3
Ring Buoys (Total)	1
With lights	1

[2] CFR 46-180-71 Life Jackets: (a) An adult life jacket must be provided for each person carried on board a vessel. (b) In additional, a number of child size life jackets equal to at least 10% of the number of persons permitted on board must be provided, or such greater number as necessary to provide a life jacket for each person being carried that is smaller than the lower size limit of the adult life jackets provided to meet this section….

With line attached 1

Equipped with EPIRB? No

In addition to the CIO requirement - Per Fleet Captain of Seaport Taxi:

Life Preserves (Child) 10-11

Ring Buoys (Total) 1

Life Preserves (Adult) 26

50’ Throw-line

Strobe light on 9’ detachable line

Further, each vessel of the Fleet carried two plastic boxes one for the captain and the second box for the mate. Some of contents are listed as follows:

Captain Box

First Aid Kit, 2 – Flashlights, Chart, CFR, Spare Bulbs, Air-horn, Spare Canister, Copy of the COI, Stability Letter,

Mate box

Tickets, Brochures, Stamper, Apron, Money Bag, Shift Report Sheets

All lifesaving equipment on the *Lady D* complied with the USCG 46 CFR - PART 180 regulations.

Safety Placards and Briefings

Under 46 CFR 185.506, passenger vessels less than 100 gross tons must make a public announcement, referred to as a safety briefing, to passengers to familiarize them with lifesaving devices on board the vessel, including where to find and how to don lifejackets. In the regulations, the Coast Guard accepts an alternative to an announcement and permitted the vessel to post placards containing information about the lifejackets. The crew of the *Lady D* provided a verbal safety briefing on some of the voyages/harbor trips. The duration of voyage is considered to be from time of departure to time of arrival at the dock. Each voyage lasted about 10 to 15 minutes, and a number of voyages were completed during the day.

Medical and Pathological Information

Medical Findings

On March 06, 2004, when the small passenger vessel *Lady D* capsized, the crew, captain and the mate, and 23 passengers where thrown into the water that occurred in the Patapsco River. According to the State of Maryland, Baltimore City Medical Examiner, the cause of death for the five passengers in each instance was drowning complicated with hypothermia. The five fatalities in the accident, three females and two males, ranged in ages six to 62.

Three of the four survivors listed in serious condition were transported by ambulance to Johns Hopkins Hospital. Two females and one male ranged in ages 55 to 59. They were treated for a

variety of injuries to include atrial fibrillation, shoulder fracture and dislocation, mild hypothermia and chest pains along with superficial abrasions and mild contusions. The fourth survivor was transported by ambulance to the University of Maryland Medical Center-Pediatrics. and CPR was performed en route to Shock Trauma. Upon arrival, she was treated for near-drowning cardiac arrest with a cold-water submersion. Twelve survivors were listed with minor injuries and were transported by ambulance to Johns Hopkins Bayview Hospital, Mercy Medical Center, Johns Hopkins Hospital or University of Maryland Medical Center. Four females and eight males ranged in age from seven to 74. The survivors were treated for hypothermia, cold-water immersion, contusion, abrasions and lacerations and released from the local hospitals.

The remaining four survivors were listed without any injuries and transported by ambulance to the local hospitals and immediately released in the emergency department.

Per USCG Sector Baltimore:

Weather DTTM (Date, Time Meridian) of 03/06/2004 at 1637

Wind speed: 20 knots; wind direction: 270 T; air temperature 55°F; visibility: 9 NM; water temperature: 40°F.

According to a senior Coast Guard official, the *U.S. Coast Guard Addendum to the National Search and Rescue Supplement* is being revised to address survivability in cold air and cold water environments. Until recently, the primary danger from immersion in cold water was considered to be death from hypothermia, a condition in which the body loses heat to the water (which conducts heat away from the body 25 times faster than air of the same temperature) and the core body temperature drops dangerously low. A 2003 study by Transport Canada[3] found, however, that hypothermia is only the third of four stages in cold water immersion at which death can occur, and that more than half the deaths related to cold-water immersion occur during the "cold shock" and swimming failure.

The Coast Guard search-and-rescue addendum will incorporate the Cold Exposure Survival Model developed by Canada's Defense and Civil Institute for Environmental Medicine. This model predicts "functional time" and survival time based on the cooling of the body's core as affected by the person's physical characteristics and clothing and the environmental conditions.[4]

[3] Transport Canada, *Survival in Cold Waters: Staying Alive*, report TP13822E (Ottawa, Ontario: 2003). The report, which was requested by the Marine Safety Directorate of Transport Canada, discusses the physiology of cold water immersion, the research into protecting people from the dangers of sudden cold water immersion, the design of immersion suits and their relation to lifejackets, and the various groups needing protection. The report incorporates an earlier Transport Canada report on cold shock and swimming failure.

[4] Functional time is the predicted number of hours after initial exposure that a person's body core temperature decreases to the end of mild hypothermia at 34 °C (93.2 °F). At functional time, the person is incapacitated by hypothermia and is at his limits of self-help. Survival time is the predicted number of hours after immersion when the person's core body temperature falls to the end of moderate hypothermia at 28 °C (82.4 °F). A person with a core temperature of 28 °C will lose consciousness. An immersed unconscious person is unable to maintain an airway, which quickly results in drowning.

The Canadian research, which builds on earlier surveys conducted in the United Kingdom and other countries, found that the critical water temperature in incidents of cold water immersion is 59 ºF (15 ºC). The Canadian study states, “Entry into water below 15 ºC should be avoided.”

Water temperature was measured at 40°F the day of the accident, which is considered cold water, and serious consequences for the human body can be developed.

The facts of the danger of immersion in cold water is as follows:

(a) There are four clear stages of immersion in which death can occur.

These are:

1. Initial immersion or cold shock (kills within 3-5 minutes after immersion)
2. Short-term immersion or swimming failure (kills within 30 minutes after immersion)
3. Long-term immersion or hypothermia (kills after 30 minutes of immersion)
4. Post rescue collapse (kills at the point of rescue or up to several hours afterwards)

(b) The cause of death associated with each stage respectively is:

1. Drowning, heart (circulatory) and respiratory problems.
2. Impaired physical performance leading to inability to self-help, swimming failure and drowning.
3. Deep body cooling leading to hypothermia and drowning.

4. Collapse of arterial blood pressure leading to cardiac arrest.

The initial responses (stage 1) peak in water between 10-15°C or 50-59°F. Swimming failure (stage 2) occurs much sooner in cold water than in warm water, even in proficient swimmers. As a consequence, people tend to grossly over-estimate their swimming capability in cold water. From all the combined research on cold water accidents, it has become clear that sudden immersion in cold water, (i.e. below 59°F) is very dangerous. It should be avoided if at all possible. Furthermore, a conscious decision to swim (and rescue oneself) or stay floating still in the water should not be taken lightly without assessing the pros and cons. It has been shown that a person's swimming ability in warm water bears no relationship to that in cold water.[5]

Survival Aspects

Emergency response by NRC-MDFD-MDPD-USCG

City of Baltimore Consolidated Communication Center

In 1995, the City of Baltimore contracted the design, build, and installation of a state-of-the-art radio and computer aided dispatch (CAD) system to improve the coordination of response efforts to major emergencies. The consolidated

[5] For more information on this subject refer to http://www.tc.gc.ca/MarineSafety/tp/Tp13822/executive-sum.htm

communications system, located at the BCFD's Emergency Communications Center, links the fire department, police and the public works department, permitting a single call to 9-1-1 to generate a multi-agency response. The shared system ensures communications compatibility among all City public safety agencies, which, in the event of a major emergency, permits an incident commander to share information with other response agencies, track the dispatch and location of assets such as emergency medical services (EMS).

Naval Reserve Center:

Initial Assets from the NRC:
19 reservists, of which 5 entered the water to rescue passengers= LCM
9 reservists that led the triage team at the Naval Reserve Center

At 1558 the City of Baltimore Police Department in the Emergency Communication Center received a cellular telephone call from the Naval Reserve Center Baltimore reporting an accident. The caller reported an accident near Fort McHenry, stating that a water taxi boat had overturned. (See police radio 9-1-1 log) That particular weekend, the reservists were drilling at the Naval Reserve Center for their weekend drills. Randomly a total of 19 people were able to launch the Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM) within minutes and were well on their way to the accident. The Reservists arrived at the site within a few minutes and stayed on scene approximately 45-60 minutes before returning to their dock with the rescued passengers. The

entire evolution from witnessing the overturned pontoon to docking took approximately 40-60 minutes. Five reservists entered the water in order to rescue passengers. At some point during the evolution, the LCM lifted the pontoon (starboard side) approximately 40 degrees, which in turn left an opening of 3-4 foot. While the pontoon was lifted three additional passengers emerged and were rescued.

Back at the Naval Reserve Center, nine members set up and led a triage team for the survivors After the LCM returned back to the pier, all but one of the reservists/rescuers, were sent via the Naval Reserve Van to the Bethesda Naval Hospital for observation, treatment and then released the same evening and returned back to the Reserve Center approximately at 2200. The Reservist that was not sent via Naval Reserve Van to Bethesda Naval Hospital was transported via ambulance with a female passenger of the *Lady D* to Harbor Hospital Center. Upon arrival, the victim was transferred to the awaiting ER team. Faculty admitted the reservist, who was treated for minor cuts, scratches, observed for a few hours, and then released.

The function of the LCM is not for search and rescue but for boat safety operations, transporting, landing, and extracting troops. The navy reservists participating in the weekend drills were not trained in rescue operations.

The following morning, members of the Baltimore City Fire Department Crisis Action Team and the local Red Cross were sent to the Naval Reserve Center to offer their services for debriefing.

Baltimore City Fire Department:

The original response units dispatched consisted of a Battalion Chief 2, Engine 26, Truck 6, Rescue 1, Fireboat #2, Fire/Rescue Boat #1, Scuba 1, Medic 5, EMS2, and Safety Officer 2.

At 1603 an initial water rescue assignment was dispatched to 1201 Halsey Place for an overturned water taxi. After the BCFD marine pilot witnessed the capsizing and personnel from the BCFD marine fire department responded, the Fire/Rescue Boat #1 arrived on scene of the overturned water taxi approximately at the same time the Landing Craft of the Naval Reserve Center. Upon their arrival at the overturned vessel they saw people standing or hanging on to the pontoon vessel. It was a very chaotic scene with people screaming that others were trapped underneath the boat. The two-member crew of the fire/rescue boat #1, a 30-foot aluminum hull boat, proceeded to the south side of the overturned vessel since the LCM was approaching from the north side.

One of the crewmembers of the fire/rescue boat decided that their best option at the time was for him to attempt to go under the vessel to rescue the people that were trapped. While first in the water he got to an unconscious and non-breathing female and proceeded to secure the victim while holding her head above water. His partner did a direct approach pattern and extended a ladder hook for the rescuer to grab. While attempting to use the ladder hook for the rescue the ladder broke and the rescuer lost his grip and was not able to hold onto the passenger. A marine police boat was in the vicinity and succeeded to rescue the passenger on their boat.

The fire rescuer reboarded the fire/rescue boat and they maneuvered the boat as close as they could to the LCM. The operator of the LCM told the fire/rescue boat that they had a young girl on board in full arrest. The crew of the LCM passed off the young girl to the paramedic on the fire/rescue boat along with her father and a Navy reservist whom was performing CPR on the young girl. They continued CPR while returned back to their Fireboat Pier #1 slip to pass off the patient for the awaiting paramedics. After passing the young girl and her father to the medics, the crew of the fire/rescue boat returned back to the LCM after having picked up two additional firefighters from the Fireboat Pier #1.

Upon arrival at the LCM, the naval reserve crew transferred another female, while performing CPR, onto the fire/rescue boat along with a navy reservist to transfer them to the dock for awaiting medic crews. Upon completion of this evolution, the fireboat shuttled divers and equipment to the large fireboat *Harold Grady*. Once all the divers and equipment had been delivered, the fire/rescue boat began searching the area for additional victims.

The Marine Pilot that saw the overturned pontoon vessel from the second floor window at the firehouse took out the 85-foot *Harold Grady*. While untying the boat, they had received a radio transmission to return to quarters to pick up the dive team. The dive team consisted of fire department personnel at different companies throughout the Baltimore City area. The dive team was able to get to the location within minutes. The *Harold Grady* was used as a platform for the dive team. The crew maneuvered the *Harold Grady* carefully through the debris field on their way to the scene. The debris field was described as pieces of the vessel that had capsized

running boards, and parts of the roof along with 20-30 lifejackets. Their mission upon arrival was for the divers to get into the water as soon as possible.

Additionally, they were all able to communicate on Channel 16 with the other fireboats, Coast Guard, police and Department of Natural Resources the day of the incident. They did not have communications with the Naval Reserve Center.

According to the statement from the Marine Pilot, they do participate in Mass Casualty Incidents drills (MCI) with other parties such as the Coast Guard, Marine Police, Special Rescue Operation (SRO) and Special Operations Command (SOC). They participate in mock disaster type drills such as hazardous material accidents, rescues, and security issues. Communications is established with the VHF radios both portable and stationary.

Baltimore City Police Department:

Initial Assets from the Baltimore City Police Department:

Marine unit crew of 5

Foxtrot (Baltimore City) with crew of 2 (pilot and observer) and Trooper 1 (Maryland State) crew of 2 (pilot and paramedic)

Land-based units (car) crew of 1

Total: approximately 13

At around 1600 the City of Baltimore Police Department in the Emergency Communication Center received a cellular telephone call from the Naval Reserve Center-Baltimore reporting an accident. At 1603 the City of Baltimore Police Department dispatched the Baltimore Police Marine Unit towards Ft. McHenry for an overturned boat-harbor rescue. A crew of five officers responded from quarters located at 3201 Boston Street on a 27-foot Sea Ark marine boat. The police marine unit responded through rough seas, three-five foot white caps along with horizontal rains towards the scene but stayed off approximately a hundred yards so not to interfere with the ongoing rescue. It took the police marine boat estimated less than four minutes to arrive at their location.

Initially observations upon arrival were people around the landing craft to be picked up. The police marine unit witnessed the LCM lifting the pontoon boat and observed a girl wash out from under the boat, along with additional life jackets. At some point, the police officer on the police marine unit noticed a firefighter from the fire department boat dive into the water to try to rescue a female but was not able to hold on to her. While the police marine unit was maneuvering their boat closer to the fireboat, they noticed the body of the previously mentioned female floating face up in the water, just below the water surface. Upon approach, the other four officers leaned over with a boat hook to grab the passenger and successfully extricated her out of the water and started CPR. She was unconscious and not breathing. Per instructions from the crew on the fire/rescue boat, the police marine unit took the victim to the boat pier located at the 3100 block of Boston Street for the awaiting medic unit. After transferring the victim, the marine police unit returned to the scene and it appeared that everyone was out of the water and immediately went into a search and rescue mode for the remainder of time

Along with the police marine unit initial response, additional seven police cruisers/units responded to 1201 Halsey Place. The first police unit arrived on scene at 1605 subsequently; six police units were dispatched and arrived at the location between 1607 and 1623. Some of the units were assigned to escort the medic units to the different hospitals in Baltimore City and others were assigned to maintain gate security at the Naval Reserve Center.

At 1646 Maryland State Police Aviation Command Trooper 1 was en route and documented on scene at 1724. Trooper 1 was launched from Baltimore Section and it performs aeromedical, search & rescue and law enforcement services. Trooper 1 crew consisted of one pilot and one paramedic. (Additional information can be found at www.mspaviation.org)

United States Coast Guard:

Initial Assets from the USCG:

Helicopter 6527, crew of 4

UTM 272005, crew of 5

UTM 212047, crew of 5

UTB 41359, crew of 3

Total: 17 crewmembers

About 1616, watchstanders at Coast Guard Sector Baltimore, located about 5 ¼ to 5 ½ nm from the accident site, learned of the capsizing while routinely monitoring radio traffic on VHF Channel 16. The Coast Guard immediately sounded the SAR alarm and launched the first of

three vessels from Coast Guard Station Curtis Bay. At 1625 Coast Guard launched a 27-foot rescue boat, Utility Boat Medium (UTM) 272005) which arrived on scene at 1637. Upon arrival, the LCM, fire rescue boat and marine police boat were already on scene. Going towards the scene, the UTM 272005 encountered debris such as lifejackets and a life ring. All but three of the passengers had been retrieved from the water. After communications with the operator of the LCM and trying to get a passenger count and gathering information, they started performing search patterns. At 1649 Utility Boat Lights (UTL) 212047 launched and arrived on the scene and at 1657, Utility Boat (UTB) 41359 launched at 1853 and arrived on scene at 1916. The UTL 212047 and the UTB 41359 were tasked to perform different types of search patterns upon arrival as the UTM 272005. Sector Baltimore released UTM 272005 and return to base about 2233.

At about 1725 Baltimore City FD had requested additional assets from the USCG including a helicopter for aerial search. Coast Guard District 5 at 1726 contacted HH65 at Airstation Atlantic City to advise them to get airborne. At 1813, HH65 from Airstation Atlantic City was enroute and advised they had a 50-minute ETA. About 1925, the HH65 inserted a DMB location 39-15.79N, 076-34.49W and continued with their assignment to search the area until they returned to base about 2310.